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REMEDIES FOR THE INSTITUTIONAL DEFICIT OF THE BTWC: 
 
PROPOSALS FOR THE SIXTH REVIEW CONFERENCE*
 
by Nicholas A Sims†
 
Introduction 
1. The BTWC's institutional deficit has been long remarked1.  Institutions are needed not for 
their own sake, or for organisational neatness, but for practical reasons.  They are needed for 
the performance of functions on behalf of the BTWC's States Parties which are best 
performed collectively; for ensuring that the BTWC's condition as a treaty regime is more 
regularly monitored and promoted than quinquennial Review Conferences alone can ever 
hope to do; for keeping track of new scientific and technological developments which pose a 
threat to the treaty regime; and for solving problems as they arise.   
 
2.  Jez Littlewood in his definitive account of the negotiations on the legally binding 
instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention 
traces proposals for remedying the BTWC's institutional deficit through the early Review 
Conferences and the near-miss of 27 September 19912, when proposals for a two-person 
secretariat support unit collapsed, to the shaping of a prospective Organization for the 
Prohibition of Biological Weapons (OPBW) by the Ad Hoc Group working on the legally 
binding instrument.  It is the fullest account of this subject yet written and it constitutes an 
invaluable resource from which to draw ideas for the future.3  
 
3.   What the BTWC needs in the longer term is still an OPBW.  But for the years 
immediately ahead some less ambitious proposals must suffice.  They will be shaped by 
everyone's expectations of what kind of event the Sixth Review Conference will prove to be. 
 
4.  The Sixth Review Conference should mark the confluence of two streams of BTWC 
development: the older-established stream of cumulative text, carrying forward all the 
reaffirmations, extended understandings, definitions and procedures elaborated by consensus 
at successive Review Conferences between 1980 and 1996, and the newer stream deriving 
                                                 
* This Review Conference Paper is developed from a paper presented at the 21st Workshop of the Pugwash 
Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions: The BWC New 
Process and the Sixth Review Conference held in Geneva, Switzerland, 4-5 December 2004. 
† Reader in International Relations, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, University of London, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK e-mail:  n.sims@lse.ac.uk 
1 Leonard Beaton (1929-1971), one of the earliest supporters of the UK initiative which led to the BTWC, 
warned that "it is clear that a general [CBW] convention must be backed up by continuous definition and a 
serious administration."  Leonard Beaton, The Reform of Power: A Proposal for an International Security 
System, London: Chatto & Windus, 1972, p.197.  Recognition of the specific institutional deficit in the BTWC 
increased in the 1980s. 
2 The final day of the Third Review Conference, when proposals for a two-person secretariat support unit for 
the newly enhanced and expanded programme of agreed CBMs collapsed.  These proposals were the most 
widely supported, as well as the most inexpensive, of all attempts to remedy the institutional deficit.  
Consequently their failure at a late stage was the subject of much recrimination at the time and later: see Jez 
Littlewood, The Biological Weapons Convention: A Failed Revolution, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005, p.191 
and p.198, note 16. 
3 Jez Littlewood, The Biological Weapons Convention: A Failed Revolution, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005, 
Chapter 8 'The Organization’. 
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from the Meetings of Experts and Meetings of States Parties of 2003-2005 held within the 
Inter Review Conference process mandated by the Fifth Review Conference.   
 
5.  Any Final Declaration which can be adopted in 2006 will be more different from the Final 
Declaration of 1996 than that of 1996 was from 1991, or 1991 from 1986, or 1986 from 
1980.  This is not just because of the ten years' lapse of time between 1996 and 2006 (instead 
of the customary five) but also because of the debacle of 2001-02 for the BTWC and the 
subsequent Inter Review Conference process from which common understandings and 
effective actions are supposed to flow, ready to be given further consideration and decisions 
reached on further action at the Review Conference in 2006. 
 
6.  This Review Conference Paper recognizes that what the BTWC needs in the longer term, 
to remedy its institutional deficit, is an OPBW.  But, as noted above, for the years 
immediately following the Sixth Review Conference some less ambitious proposals must 
suffice.  These might comprise an annual meeting of States Parties, or an open-ended meeting 
of their Bureau, supported by a Scientific Advisory Panel and a permanent Secretariat.  All 
would derive their authority from the Sixth Review Conference.  Proposals for their scope 
and mandate will need careful preparation between now and 20064. 
 
Proposals 
 
7.  It would be prudent to seek to achieve the most from the Inter Review Conference 
process, however meagre its achievements between 2003 and 2005.  The outcome of the 
Meeting of the States Parties in 2004 is encouraging in that the language in its report5 that: 
 
23. States Parties are encouraged to inform the Sixth Review Conference of, inter 
alia, any actions, measures or other steps that they may have taken on the basis of the 
discussions at the 2004 Meeting of Experts and of the outcome of the 2004 Meeting of 
States Parties in order to facilitate the Sixth Review Conference’s consideration of the 
work undertaken at the meetings in 2004 and of a decision on any further action in 
accordance with paragraph 18 (e) of the decision adopted at the Fifth Review 
Conference (BWC/CONF.V/17). 
 
provides a clear linkage to consideration by the Sixth Review Conference and decisions on 
further action.   This may lead to a new emphasis on capacity-building and mutual assistance 
to be carried forward, although this is by no means certain.  In addition, there might also be a 
place for an Annual Meeting of States Parties – albeit  suitably adapted so as to place it on a 
quite different basis from that of 2003-2005 – perhaps analogous to that of the annual 
Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Conference. 
 
8.  A certain evolution can already be detected.  Within the Inter Review Conference process 
each Meeting of States Parties, like the Meeting of Experts which precedes it, is confined to 
                                                 
4 The importance of starting to prepare now for the Sixth Review Conference is stressed in Graham S. Pearson 
& Nicholas A. Sims, Preparing for the BTWC Sixth Review Conference in 2006, University of Bradford, 
Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 10, February 2005.  Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc  
5 United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 
Second Meeting, Geneva, 6 – 10 December 2004, Report of the Meeting of States Parties, BWC/MSP/2004/3, 
14 December 2004. Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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particular topics: two in 2003, two in 2004, one in 2005.  Its agenda and to a large extent its 
range of possible outcomes are constrained by the decision of the Fifth Review Conference 
from November 20026.  The decision in paragraph 18 stated that “the Conference decided (a) 
To hold three annual meetings …”.    This appeared to reflect the terminology in the language 
tabled by the United States in the final hours of the December 2001 session of the Fifth 
Review Conference that led to the suspension of that Review Conference and which did 
indeed refer to annual meetings of the States Parties7: 
 
"1. The Conference decides, beginning in November 2002, that States Parties will 
meet annually between the Fifth Review Conference and the Sixth Review Conference 
to 
 
(a) consider and assess progress by States Parties in implementing the new 
measures adopted at the Fifth Review Conference; and 
 
(b) consider new measures or mechanisms for effectively strengthening the 
BWC 
 
2.  The Conference decides that an Expert Group may meet, following each annual 
meeting of the States Parties if agreed at the annual meeting.  The Experts group will 
examine matters as directed by the States Parties at the preceding annual meeting.  
The Experts Group will not negotiate measures, but may provide a report, adopted by 
consensus, to the States Parties on matters examined. 
 
9.   Consequently, it was not surprising that some States Parties began at the first Meeting of 
States Parties on 10 November 2003 to call the event 'the Annual Meeting of States Parties';  
and a few went further and seized the opportunity to push the limits of the agenda by 
expressing their views on the state of the Convention as a whole.  Brazil, for example, 
repeated themes it had presented at the opening session of the Meeting of Experts on 18 
August 2003.  At the opening session of the Meeting of States Parties, it stated8 (inter alia): 
 
The regime to prevent biological weapons is based on a set of reciprocal obligations 
negotiated by the States Parties to the BTWC. 
 
We should take fully into account that countries signed the BTWC as an integrated 
group of fifteen articles covering the concerns and objectives of States Parties. 
 
These include, inter alia, the issues of disarmament, non-proliferation, and 
biodefense, as well as the need to ensure access to the peaceful uses of biology, 
                                                 
6 United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, Geneva, 19 November – 7 December 2001 and 11 – 22 November 2002, Final Document, 
BWC/CONF. V/17, Geneva 2002, paragraph 18. Available at http://www.opbw.org 
7 Graham S. Pearson, The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Report from Geneva, Quarterly Review 
no 17, CBW Conventions Bulletin No.54, December 2001. Available at 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/pdfbulletin.html 
8 Statement by Brazil, in United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, Geneva, First Meeting 10 -- 14 November 2003, Report of the Meeting of States Parties, Volume 
II, Annex II, Statements, Presentations and Contributions made available to the Chairman, BWC/MSP/2003/4 
(Vol.II), 26 November 2003, pages 66-67. Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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including biotechnology, scientific and technological cooperation, and humanitarian 
assistance... 
 
...no selective implementation of the BTWC is viable, nor should it be allowed."  (4) 
 
10.  The statements made9 during the General Debate/Discussion on the opening day of 
MSP/2003 on 10 November 2003 shows some movement by delegations in the direction of 
treating the occasion as an 'Annual Meeting of States Parties' with an implicitly BTWC-wide 
agenda, although admittedly most delegations on this evidence confined themselves strictly 
to the two agenda topics of 2003 as the decision of the Fifth Review Conference establishing 
the Inter Review Conference process had decreed. 
 
11.  In the statements made at the opening plenary session10 of the Meeting of States Parties 
on 6 December 2004 there were two references to "the Annual Meeting" (Brazil and Russia) 
but it is also possible to see signs of a trend towards acceptance of a more established role for 
this annual event within the life of the BTWC in the title "the Second Meeting of States 
Parties" used by Iran, Morocco and the Republic of Korea.  More significant still is the title 
"Conference of States Parties" used by Italy, Saudi Arabia and Argentina. 
 
12.  Ambassador Carlo Trezza introduced his account of Italy's contribution to the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction programme with the words: 
 
"I take the opportunity of this Conference to draw for the first time the attention of the 
Conference of the States Parties of the Biological Weapons on this issue" 
 
and later in his statement referred to 
 
"the Conference of States Parties of the BWC." 
 
The representative of Saudi Arabia, Naif bin Bandar al Sudairy, referred in both the title and 
the text of his statement to the "Conference of States Parties to the Convention on 
Prohibition of Biological Weapons" and in the body of the text the words "this important 
conference" and "our conference" are used.  For Argentina, Minister Marcelo Valle Fonrouge 
referred to "La Conferencia de Estados Partes de la Convencion sobre la prohibicion de las 
armas biologicas". 
 
13.  The use of words so closely associated with the title of the plenary body in the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC), which meets in regular session every year and in special 
session as necessary, is at least suggestive of a readiness to think in terms of a plenary body 
for the BTWC equivalent to the annual Conference of the States Parties to the CWC and 
meeting at approximately the same frequency. 
 
                                                 
9 United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 
Geneva, First Meeting 10 -- 14 November 2003, Report of the Meeting of States Parties, Volume II, Annex II, 
Statements, Presentations and Contributions made available to the Chairman, BWC/MSP/2003/4 (Vol.II), 26 
November 2003, pages 6-81. Available at http://www.opbw.org 
10 The statements made at the opening plenary session of MSP/2004 on 6 December 2004 are available at 
http://www.opbw.org 
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14.  Analysis of the statements made on 6 December 2004 also shows that more States Parties 
than in 2003 used the occasion to offer general observations on the future of the BTWC.  
Several States Parties, as before, stuck closely to the two agenda items prescribed for the 
2004 Meeting of States Parties.  Examples are the statements of the United States, United 
Kingdom, China, Indonesia, Republic of Korea and Switzerland. But others ranged beyond 
the confines of such a narrowly defined agenda. 
 
15.  Nigeria, for example, observed that "the BTWC has no solid foundation and requires a 
lot of work in terms of installing the necessary institutional framework and mechanism"; 
while Brazil used the opportunity to restate its insistence on seeing the BTWC as an 
"integrated group of fifteen articles covering the concerns and objectives of States Parties", a 
perspective in which the selective attention to particular topics dictated by the Inter Review 
Conference process agenda is open to criticism. 
 
16.  Japan praised "the three year programme of work" but added: 
 
"We will need to consider how to carry the new BWC process forward, including the 
issue of verification, as we prepare for the 2006 Review Conference." 
 
17.  In addition, Malaysia speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other 
States Parties said: 
 
“3. Like the rest of the international community, all members of the Group are 
seriously concerned with the potential threats of use of biological agents and toxins 
as an instrument of war and terror. In light of this development, the Group feels that 
there is a greater necessity and urgency for the States Parties of the BWC to work 
towards strengthening and improving the effectiveness and implementation of this 
Convention so that together we can fully address this concern. 
 
4. The high importance the Group attaches to an effective and verifiable BWC, 
implemented in a comprehensive manner, cannot be overemphasized.” 
 
18.  This forward-looking use of the 6 December plenary session was carried further by the 
Netherlands Presidency on behalf of the 25 member states of the European Union and ten 
other European states wishing to associate themselves with the statement.  This statement 
combined endorsement of the "current working programme" of the Inter Review Conference 
process with a reaffirmation of the EU common position in favour of BTWC verification and 
a new emphasis on the importance of the 2006 Review Conference.  Key sentences were: 
 
"The EU remains committed to develop measures to verify compliance with the 
BTWC." 
 
"The Review Conference in 2006 will be a good opportunity to agree on specific, 
practical and realistic measures to strengthen both the Convention itself and 
compliance with it." 
 
19.  Norway went further, in singling out for endorsement from the Report of the UN 
Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change the Panel's 
Recommendation 27: 
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"States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should without delay 
return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the active 
participation of the biotechnology industry." 
 
New Zealand "weighed the words" of the High-Level Panel, while several other States Parties 
(including India, Iran, Malaysia and Pakistan) urged the need for a BTWC verification 
protocol, and Germany without using the word 'verification' called for "a multilaterally 
negotiated protocol to strengthen the BTWC." 
 
20.  Indeed, the Chairman of MSP/2004, Peter Goosen of South Africa, in his opening 
remarks noted that the BTWC does not exist in a vacuum and that the High-Level Panel 
report issued on 2 December 2004 had made recommendations of direct relevance to the 
Convention.  He mentioned Recommendation 27 and said that, whilst these were only 
recommendations that had yet to be considered, they should, nevertheless, be borne in mind 
as some have direct relevance to the Convention. 
 
21.  All these statements in their different ways represented a trend towards the institution of 
an Annual Meeting with a BTWC-wide agenda.  
 
22.  A useful proposal for the Sixth Review Conference would be to institute explicitly an 
Annual Meeting of States Parties, with an agenda ranging across the BTWC as a whole, to 
meet in 2007 and successive years, its functions and mandate to be derived from the 
Conference of 2006. 
 
23.  A part of its time should be dedicated to the collective scrutiny of scientific and 
technological developments relevant to the BTWC.  The rapid pace of change in relevant 
areas of science and technology is one of the most powerful factors driving a need for more 
frequent meetings – a point made by the United Kingdom in 2001 in its contribution11 to the 
background paper on scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention in 
which the UK said: 
 
18.  Throughout the various studies and consultations carried out by the UK to 
inform this review, it has been clear that the rate of change in science and technology 
fields relevant to the BTWC has been much greater than in the previous five year 
period, that is between the third and fourth Review Conferences.  A number of 
advances in scientific knowledge and its applications could be of consequence for the 
provisions of the BTWC.  Given the accelerating pace in science and technology, the 
UK wonders whether it is prudent to maintain a five year gap between such 
assessments under the BTWC.  The UK suggests that the upcoming Review 
Conference consider establishing a mechanism for States Parties to work together on 
a more frequent basis to conduct such scientific and technical reviews and to consider 
any implications at the necessary level of expertise. 
 
                                                 
11 Information provided by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland contained in Fifth 
Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Geneva, 19 
November – 7 December 2001, Background Paper on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant 
to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF.V/4/Add.1, 26 October 2001. 
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24.  The Fifth Review Conference did not establish such a mechanism, which should 
accordingly be considered by the Sixth Review Conference.  Five years is simply too long an 
interval over which to leave the implications of change unexamined.  A practical mechanism 
for organising this collective scrutiny would be to commission a Scientific Advisory Panel to 
prepare a report each year for the Annual Meeting.  There has long been a persuasive case in 
any event for the States Parties to create a Scientific Advisory Panel.   They need to equip the 
BTWC with such a Panel in the interests of acquiring an early warning capacity for 
monitoring scientific threats to their treaty regime. 
 
25.  Another indispensable call on the time of the Annual Meeting should be the 
'consolidation agenda' of progress towards completion of actions by States Parties in 
accordance with their politically-binding commitments long since accepted by consensus.  
All were contained in Final Declarations of the first four Review Conference from 1980 to 
1996.   An earlier proposal12 had expressed the hope that such completion might be achieved 
by the time the thirtieth anniversary of the BTWC's entry into force comes to be 
commemorated on 26 March 2005.  Realistically, however, this 'consolidation agenda' will 
remain live beyond that date.  Progress towards completion should therefore be reported year 
by year.   
 
26.  It is possible, given the widespread recognition of the importance of achieving universal 
adherence to the BTWC and of universal enactment of national implementation legislation, 
that the Sixth Review Conference might decide, following its consideration of the topics 
considered in the Inter Review Conference process in 2003, to adopt Action Plans.  These 
could be based on the model of the Action Plans for universality and for national 
implementation legislation adopted at the First Review Conference of the CWC and 
subsequently implemented by its Conference of the States Parties in 2003.  There would be 
advantage in subsequent Annual Meetings of the States Parties monitoring and taking any 
further actions needed to achieve full implementation of such Action Plans.  In addition, 
Annual Meetings might even adopt Action Plans, to encourage progress, in relevant areas of 
the Convention. 
 
27.  Additional functions could be undertaken within the pattern of sessions of the Annual 
Meeting as need arises in 2007 and successive years, provided sufficient flexibility is built 
into the mandate given to the Annual Meeting by the Sixth Review Conference.  Flexibility 
in the mandate is essential if unforeseen problems are to be solved by the BTWC States 
Parties as they arise. 
 
28.  An alternative approach instead of such Annual Meetings could be for the Sixth Review 
Conference to authorise its Bureau to hold regular meetings after 2006 in the inter Review 
Conference years for these collective purposes.  If these were open-ended meetings, or if the 
Bureau were allowed to convene Meetings of States Parties at its discretion, potential breadth 
of participation could be combined with an identifiable nucleus of responsibility.   
 
29.  The idea of authorising the Bureau of the Review Conference to remain in existence and 
to continue meeting until the next Review Conference, as a standing committee of the States 
                                                 
12 Nicholas A. Sims, A proposal for putting the 26 March 2005 anniversary to best use for the BWC, CBW 
Conventions Bulletin No. 62, December 2003, pp 1-6. Available at 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/pdfbulletin.html    Nicholas A. Sims, Towards the BTWC Sixth Review 
Conference: Making Best Use of the 26 March 2005 Anniversary, University of Bradford, Department of Peace 
Studies, Briefing Paper (Second Series) No.10, December 2003. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc  
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Parties to the BTWC, goes back to 1990.  It was proposed13  by the US arms control expert 
and retired ambassador Charles C. Flowerree, who had led the US delegation to the BTWC 
First Review Conference in 1980.   Ambassador Flowerree saw the Bureau as a variant on the 
Committee of Oversight proposed in the academic literature during the 1980s14.  In his view, 
it would secure the advantages of regional and other balances needed for a representative 
body, without the trouble of fresh elections.  He thought a continuing Bureau would be 
particularly valuable in upholding the Convention when doubts over compliance might arise. 
 
30.  Since 1990 the contingency mechanism for such compliance diplomacy under BTWC 
Article V has developed into Informal and Formal Consultative Meetings, as demonstrated in 
1997 when this procedure was invoked for the first time.  However, the role of the Bureau of 
the Consultative Meeting in 1997 over the Thrips palmi allegations by Cuba against the 
United States suggests that a small committee, chosen to be representative of the political and 
geographical spread of States Parties, is indispensable. 
 
31.  A Bureau of the Review Conference could still have a role to play in upholding the 
Convention when, for whatever reason, the Consultative Meeting procedure under Article V 
was not invoked; and it would have a much wider role representing the interests of the States 
Parties as a collectivity and overseeing the progress of the BTWC in the round. 
 
32.  Canada has prospectively combined the two bodies, one plenary, one representative, in 
its proposal15 of 5 April 2004 for 'Overcoming the institutional deficit of the NPT'.  It starts 
by observing that: 
 
"Unlike the more modern non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament accords, 
the NPT lacks provisions and institutional machinery to protect adequately the 
interests of its States Parties.  There is no annual meeting of States Parties, no 
standing bureau and no dedicated organization or secretariat to oversee the state of 
health of the Treaty.  The IAEA has certain on-going responsibilities under the 
Treaty, but they are limited in scope and its membership and that of the NPT are not 
co-terminous.  Only the quinquennial Review Conferences are empowered to take 
decisions on behalf of the States Parties.  The interests of the Treaty membership are 
not well-served by a situation where it can only exercise its decision-making functions 
once every five years." 
 
All these observations, bar one, apply equally to the BTWC.  Indeed, the plight of the BTWC 
is even worse than that of the NPT, in terms of institutional deficit, because it does not even 
have the limited services of the IAEA or an equivalent organisation at its disposal.  ('Limited' 
because the IAEA, so far from being a treaty organisation for the NPT, merely carries out 
some functions for it, notably through the Safeguards Agreements required under Article III.) 
 
33.  In the context of the NPT, Canada goes on to state: 
 
                                                 
13 Charles C. Flowerree, On tending arms control agreements, The Washington Quarterly, vol.13 no.1 (Winter 
1990), pp. 199-214. 
14 Nicholas A. Sims, The Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament: Vicissitudes of a Treaty in Force, 1975-85  
(London: Macmillan;  New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988)  pp. 298-306. 
15 Working Paper submitted by Canada to the Third Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review 
Conference: NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.1 (5 April 2004). Available at 
http:///www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/papers/canadawp1.pdf    
10 
 "we believe the time is right to overcome the institutional deficit and recommend the 
following: 
 
(i) Replace the present Preparatory Committees with Annual General 
Conferences of States Parties to consider and decide on any issues covered by 
the Treaty.  Such Conferences would have a duration of one week, although in 
the year immediately preceding a Review Conference, the Annual Conference 
would extend two weeks and carry out the function of a preparatory committee 
for that Review Conference.  The overall time allocation for these conferences 
would remain within the current six weeks devoted to the Preparatory process. 
 
(ii) The bureau of the review process be reconstituted as a standing bureau of 
the Treaty comprised of the President and Chairs of the quinquennial Review 
conference (to be elected at the end of each Review Conference with a 
mandate extending until the subsequent Review Conference).  This bureau 
would be empowered, at the request of the Depositary Governments, the UN 
Secretary-General or pursuant to a consensus decision of their own, to 
convene extraordinary sessions of the General Conference of States Parties 
when situations arose that threatened the integrity or viability of the Treaty, 
for example, a notification of intent to withdraw from the Treaty or the 
violation by a State Party of its obligations under the Treaty. 
 
(iii) The UN Department of Disarmament Affairs would, within existing 
resources, continue to provide support to the bureau, the annual conferences 
and any extraordinary sessions." 
 
34.  Rebecca Johnson in a recent article16 has drawn attention to the Irish precursors of the 
Canadian proposal, and offers an interestingly worked example of improvements which such 
innovations might bring to the handling of NPT problems.  The BTWC differs from the NPT 
in other respects, but in seeking to remedy its institutional deficit the States Parties to the 
BTWC would be well advised to consider the remedies Ireland and Canada have proposed for 
the NPT and to see how they could be adapted to the requirements of the BTWC. 
 
35.  Whatever the precise nature of the inter-governmental Bureau or Annual Meeting, or a 
combination of the two, a small permanent Secretariat would be essential.  Useful experience 
of secretariat functions related to aspects of the BTWC has been built up fairly continuously 
since 1991; but it is important to remember that each secretariat has been the secretariat of a 
distinct Review Conference, or Special Conference, or Ad Hoc Group, or Meeting of Experts 
or of States Parties under the Inter Review Conference process.  Formally, the BTWC as such 
still has no secretariat.  To point this out is not to detract in any way from the devoted service 
that members of successive secretariats have given under the auspices of the UN Department 
for Disarmament Affairs.  Rather, it is to encourage the Sixth Review Conference to put this 
succession of formally discrete secretariats on to a permanent footing, as a BTWC 
Secretariat, adequately resourced to meet the predicted needs of the BTWC treaty regime as it 
will evolve in the years following 2006. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Rebecca Johnson, Is the NPT up to the challenge of proliferation?, Disarmament Forum 2004/4, Autumn 
2004, pp 9-19, at p 16. 
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Conclusions 
 
36.  Past proposals for remedying the BTWC's institutional deficit led to the proposed OPBW 
which was in prospect from 1997 to 2001 in the context of strengthening the effectiveness 
and improving the implementation of the Convention under a legally binding instrument that 
was then under negotiation.  Because of what happened to these negotiations, an OPBW 
remains a longer-term necessity but not an immediate possibility. 
 
37.  So the gap must be filled in the short term by less ambitious remedies.  Those proposed 
in this paper – an Annual Meeting of States Parties, and/or a Bureau of the Review 
Conference extended into the follow-up years with open-ended meetings or the power to 
convene Meetings of States Parties as need arises, supported by a Scientific Advisory Panel 
and a  Secretariat – do not require the BTWC Article XI amendment process to be invoked.  
They are fully within the power of the Sixth Review Conference to authorise.  What is 
needed between now and then is careful preparation of proposals so that the Sixth Review 
Conference in 2006 can agree their scope and mandate. 
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